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RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Supreme Court of Vemont.
aORACE AUSTIN AND OTHERS V. THE RUTLAND RAILROAD COMIPANY AND OTHERS.
A tenant in common wrongfully excluded by his co-tenant from possession of
the common property may ordinarily maintain ejectm Snt for his interest.

One moiety of land was held by a railroad company in fee and the other moiety
by a tenant for life. The railroad company acquired tae life estate and then built
its road over the laud. After the expiration of the life estate the remainder-man
brought ejectment to recover possession of the land jointly with the company.
Hdd, that the action would not lie.
The building of the road by the company while it had the exclusive right of
possession was a lawful use of its own property and could not be changed into an
unlawful ouster of the plaintiff by his subsequently accrued right of joint posses.
sion. The circumstances of such a case take it out of the ordinary rule, and the
plaintiff is remitted to his statutory remedy for damages.
The lot was on the shore of Lake Champlain. During the time of the railroad
company's exclusive possession it built a wharf out into the lake beyond low-water
mark. Held, that plaintiffs had no right or interest in this wharf, and it must be
excluded in assessing the value of their estate in the lot.
The owner of land in Vermont bordering on Lake Champlain has no title below
low-water mark except by statute, which gives him the right to build a wharf or
dock in front of his land. Therefore this wharf was not a building on plaintiff's
land, nor an accretion to it in the legal sense; it was a mere abutting against it
by a structure built outside of it.

THIs was an action of ejectment.
opinion.

The facts are stated in the

TV. Cr. Snaw and E. J. Phelps, for plaintiff, cited McAuley v,
Western -Ft.B. B. Co., 33 Vt. 311 ; Knapp v. 1-IcAuley, 39 Vt.
275; Blundell v. Catterall,7 E. C. L. 152; East Haven v. H7emingway, 7 Conn. 186; 9 Conn. 37; 20 Conn. 117; 32 Conn.
501; 1 Black 23; 7 Wallace 289; 10 Wallace 504; 29 Ind.
364; 5 Sanf. 48; 15 Conn. 136; 1 Wash. Real -Prop.437.
Daniel Roberts, for defendants, cited 28 Vt. 257; Doug. Rep.
441; 19 N. Y. 523; 6 N. Y. 522; 8 Cow. 146; Law Reporter,
March 1871, p. 165; 15 Gray 1; 25 Conn. 352.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BARRETT, J.-The plaintiffs have brought ejectment for the
recovery of possession of the premises in question, upon their title
to an estate in remainder under the will of their grandfather, who
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died in 1810. By his will he gave a life estate in water-lot N&.
10, in Burlington, to his two daughters, Avis and Nelly, in equal
undivided moieties, remainder to the heirs of each in the same
moieties in fee. The plaintiffs are the children of Nelly, she having died in January 1870. Many years ago the title and right
of Avis and her children became vested in the defendants, as also
did the life estate of said Nelly; and they held the exclusive possession of the property under such acquired title and right. On
the decease of said Nelly Austin her children, the plaintiffs, succeeded in remainder to their rights as owners in common with the
defendants of an undivided moiety of said lot No. 10. Prior to
this event, and while the defendants were holding the exclusive
possession of said lot, their railroad was duly located upon it, and
the whole of it was thus appropriated, and has ever since been
held and used, and still continues to be held and used, for the
ordinary, necessary and legitimate purposes of the railroad. The
plaintiffs have thereby been excluded from the possession, occupancy and use thereof. There has been no appraisal or payment
of land-damages, as provided by the statute laws of this state, nor
in any other way. The plaintiffs, after due demand of possession,
and refusal by the defendants, brought this action.
The question is, are they entitled to maintain it? It is conceded that the defendants were rightfully in the exclusive possession
till the termination of the life estate of said Kelly, as aforesaid,
in 1870, and that, during such possession, "they might do what
they pleased with the land, provided they committed no waste."
Being in possession with such title and right, it was legitimate for
them to locate and make the railroad as was done, and to continue it, without payment of damages to anybody, up to the time
that plaintiffs could assert a right in themselves, as against the
defendants. It was incident to the tenure of the defendants, as
well as to the title and estate of the plaintiffs, that the railroad
might be located, made and used, without payment of damages to
tile plaintiffs, during the period of the defendant's right to exclusive possession in virtue of such tenure. There was no life-tenant
to be regarded. There -was no remainder-man to be regarded, till
such remainder-man's right to claim possession was available to
him. We think, then, that all the reasons for what was held in
the cases of McAuley v. Railroad Company in 33 and 39 Vt.,
and in Troy] and Bos. B. R. Co. v. Potter, 42 Vt. 272, apply
with unabated force in the present case.
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Saying nothing as to the matter of knowledge and implied assent
on the part of some of the plaintiffs, upon which a point was made
in the argument, it would seem that when the defendants, in the
exercise of their lawful right as against these plaintiffs, have
located and made their road on the lot in question, they should
no more be subjected to being ousted, or to having the plaintiffs
let into co-possession, than in case the plaintiffs had been absolute
owners -of the whole lot throughout, and had assented to the doing
of the same, without having the damages first appraised and paid.
In the cases referred to above, the point of the reason against
permitting the landowner to eject the corporation, or to be let
into possession, joint or otherwise, is, that the corporation bad
done a lawful act in locating and making the road through the
land in question, without first having the damages appraised and
paid. In those cases the lawfulness of the act resulted from the
consent of the landowner. In the case before us, the act was
equally lawful, it having been done by the party lawfully in exelusive possession,'and who might lawfully do it in virtue of its
title and estate in the premises. This being so, we think it would
contravene both the reason and the rules that have had operation
and force on this subject, now to hold that the lately accrued right
to the plaintiffs, of availing themselves of their estate in the premises, changes what the defendants have done in locating, making
and maintaining their railroad into a wrong as against these plaintiffs, and the exclusion of them from a co-occupancy, into such an
unlawful ouster as will entitle them to maintain this action.
On the other hand, the provisions of our statutes seem plainly
to indicate the legislative sense of the state to be in harmony with
the judicial sense, as manifested in the decided cases involving the
subject.
Sect. 17, Oh. 28, Gen. Stat., which makes provision for the appraisal of land damages in case the parties do not agree about
them, contemplates that, in some cases, land may be taken and
damage thereby sustained before appraisal shall have been made,
and it contains provisions for the appraisal and payment of damages
in such cases, as well as in others. In this connection it should
be remarked, that the provisions of the statute for the appraisal
of damages before the said road can lawfully be made, do not seem
to contemplate, or to be adapted to a case like the present. It
does not fall within the terms or the meaning of sect. 20 of that
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chapter, which is applicable only to cases in which damage to right
of dower, or estate for life or years, is to be appraised, in which
cases the damage to the reversionary interest may also be appraised.
Here was no estate for life to be damaged, for it was in the defendants; and so it was not a case for appraising damages to the
interest in remainder. Indeed, the inapplicability to this case of
the other incidental details, in the provisions for the appraisal of
land damages before the making of the road, enforce the idea that
cases like the present were not intended to be subject to those
provisions.
When we turn to section 26 of the same chapter, it is seen to be
full and explicit in provisions for such cases, thus: "In every case
where a railroad company have entered upon, taken possession of
and used land and real estate for the construction and accommodation of their railroad * * * and shall not have paid the owner
therefor, nor, within two years from such entry, had the damages
appraised, &c., the ordinary courts of law shall have jurisdiction
thereof, to wit: justices of the peace, &c., and the county court,
&c., and any person claiming damages may bring suit therefor, in
the usual form, &c., and shall recover only actual damages."
This seems to contemplate that the company might have two
years after such entry, taking possession and using, in which to
get such damages appraised pursuant to the provisions of see. 17.
It seems difficult to suppose that it was contemplated at the same
time, that in the mean time they should be liable to be ousted by
action of ejectment. We think that the alternative remedy provided in section 26 clearly indicates that, after the lapse of said two
years, without such appraisal having been made, not by ousting the
company by action of ejectment, but by suit for damages, the
landowner is to get what he would have realized as the fruit of the
proceeding provided in section 17.
Tlhee provisions of the statute seem to recognise the peculiar character of the subject-matter, much as the courts have recognised and
regarded it, in our own and in other states. A most marked
instance of such recognition is the case of Sturgis v. M_Tiller, 31 1t.
1. The same is true of the other cases above referred to.
We concur, then, in holding that, in the case as it is now before
us, the plaintiffs are not entitled to have a judgment, giving them
co-possession with the defendants of the land in question. In the
views thus presented, we design to propound only the law of the
present case, leaving cases made up of other elements, and charac-
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terized by different features, to abide such consideration as may
seem meet when they shall be before the court for adjudication.
In holding as we do in this case, we are not unmindful that a
party, in ordinary cases, unaffected by peculiar statutory provis'ons,
would be entitled to maintain ejectment against his co-tenant, when
wrongfully excluded from the possession of the common property
by such co-tenant.
We put this decision on the ground, as above indicated, that the
subject-matter (when regarded with reference to the law ordinarily
governing the action of ejectment in its origin and development)
is extraordinary and peculiar-that the property was lawfully put
to its present use by the defendants, as against these plaintiffsthat special statutory provision is made for ample remedy in such a
case, and, having reference to the public interests involved in, and
,affected by, ihe construction and operation of railroads; and, in
view of wh.4;, has been held in other cases standing upon the same
reasons, it is fairly to be assumed that such statutory provision for
remedy was intended to supersede the common remedy by action
of ejectment, which is available in ordinary cases between tenants
in common.
We have iot deemed it advisable to enter upon a discussion of
the questioT, whether the plaintiffs would have a lien for the damages recovered by them under said section 26, as our attention was
not called to it in the argument, except by a passage in the brief for
defendants-that "plaintiffs' right to full damages are reserved to
them by a specific lien on the lands," citing said sections 17 and
26, Gen. St. ch. 28. Of course, aside from such resource, they
would have all the rights of any judgment-creditor for enforcing
judgment against a judgment-debtor.
II. The case presents another and distinct feature, viz. : within
the period of the defendants' exclusive possession of said lot, the
defendants, in the construction of said railroad, and for the laying of
necessary tracks, had filled in with earth a distance of 110 feet
into the lake, beyond the original water-boundary of said lot,
and had built a dock extending still further into the lake.
It is claimed for the plaintiffs, that said made land and dock are
embraced within the estate which they own under said will of their
grandfather. The township of Burlington, in the original location
and survey, was bounded west "on the shore of Lake Champlain."
The lot. in its original location and survey, and as it was desci ibed
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in the proprietor's records, contained twenty rods of land. bounded
on the north by the south line of South street, east by the west
line of Water street; being fifty links in width on said Water
street, and bounded "west by the waters of Lake Champlain."
In the year 1800 that lot, thus bounded, became the property of
said testator. It remained unchanged in that respect, and in the
condition of its water-front, during the life of the testator, and up
to the time when the defendants made said additions of land into
the water of the lake. Neither the testator, nor any one under
him, made any erections or structures on the water-front, in the
character of pier, dock, wharf or storehouse. So nothing had
been done in the nature of asserting or exercising any right in
those respects, as appertaining to that lot, in reference to the
lakes for any purpose. The testator enclosed and occupied during
his life only the east half of said lot; defendant's counsel understand that lot No. 10 extended to low-water mark, and that the
estate of the plaintiffs extends to the same line. The right of the
plaintiffs is thus conceded to the utmost limit of title and ownership in the soil known to the law, as shown by the text-books and
decided cases, -whether in the nature of a corporeal or incorporeal
hereditament. All that can be claimed for the plaintiffs, as the
ground of their alleged title and interest in the made land, is the
right that the owner of said lot, as it originally was, had to pass to
and from the waters of the lake within the width of the lot, as it
bordered on and was washed by said waters. It is not denied that
the lake is "navigable water," in the sense of the law governing
public and private rights in respect thereto. There is no occasion
therefore to discuss or decide whether the common law of England,
or of Massachusetts, or of Connecticut, or of any other state, is
the common law of Vermont as to such rights. We remark, however, that there is no common law of Vermont, by which the
owner of land bounded on Lake Champlain has a right, beyond
low-water mark, to appropriate as his own the bed of the lake.
Neither the legislature nor the courts have recognised any such
right except as it has been conferred by act of legislation. And the
whole course of legislation on the subject indicates that there was
no such right by any kind of common law in this state: see Act of
1802, granting to the Burlington Bay Wharf Co. the privilege of
erecting and continuing a wharf. Also the Act of 1825, giving the
right to Messrs. Keyes to extend a wharf into the lake from
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low-water mark. Also Acts No. 41 and No. 42, in 1826, of a
similar character.
The matter had thus proceeded up to 1839, when, in the revised
statutes of that year, sect. 7, ch. 59, it was enacted, that: "All
persons who may have erected any wharves, &c., agreeably to the
provisions of any grant heretofore made, or agreeably to the provisions of this chapter, their heirs and assigns, shall have the
exclusive right to the use, benefit and control of such wharves, &c.,
for ever." This seems plainly to show the idea of the legislature
to have been, that the right to build a wharf or other structure
beyond the land of the riparian owner, into the water of the lake,
depended on a legislative grant, either shown or presumed. And
the same is clearly shown by the preceding see. 5., viz.: "1Any
person owning lands, adjoining Lake Champlain, may erect any
wharf or store-house, and extend the same from the land of such
person in a direct course into Lake Champlain * * * between the
lands of such person and the channel of the lake." This contemplates that the right to build into the lake "from the land," &c.,
is given by that provision of the statute.
There is no ground for claiming that those general legislative
enactments were only in affirmance of already existing common
law of the state; for, not only does the fact of such legislation,
and the terms and provisions of it, discountenance such claim, but
the special legislation that had preceded it, andwhich is emphatically
recognised in said sec. 7, ch. 59, Rev. St., is altogether inconsistent with it. The right, then, that existed in the testator, as
owner of lot No. 10, was not a right appurtenant to the lot to
build into the lake in front of it. He had only, and at most, so
far at the lake was concerned, a right in common with all other
persons, to use the waters of the lake in any proper way, and for
any proper purpose. As the absolute owner of said lot, he had
the exclusive right to use it in passing to and from the lake. But
this gave him no peculiar or additional right as to the lake itself.
Of course it could not give him title to erections or structures made
by others beyond the limits of his own land. If, in making such
erections and structures, others should violate any right of his, as
owner of the land to low-water mark, he could seek redress in some
proper way, but not by action based on his right as the owner of
them. If they should be a nuisance, in the legal sense, the abatement of them might be invoked by a proceeding proper for that
purpose. The doctrines of the law as applicable to this feature of
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the case are well developed and applied in Gould v. ifud. Riv. R.
R. Co., 2 Seld. (6 N. Y.) 522, and in Prest. &c.Harv. Col. v.
Stearns, 15 Gray 1; also in Patt. &Newark B. B. Co. v. Stevens,
10 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 165.
In those cases the learning of the subject is so amply embodied,
analyzed and applied, that little would be gained by repeating
what has been done by the learned courts in the decisions referred
to. The case of Nichols v. Lewis, 15 Conn. 136, is not at odds
with the views which- we hold in the case in hand. In that
case it was held that the plaintiff owned a tangible property between high and low water-mark where the tide ebbed and flowed,
of which he was entitled to the possession as against the defendant, by whom he bad been ousted, and that he could recover by
ejectment the possession of the loum in quo, notwithstanding the
defendant had made on it a dump or fill of earth-so far as the
dump was concerned, it being put on the same ground, "as if a
man builds on another's land, the building belongs to the owner
of the land."
The kind of estate which, in Connedticut, a riparian owner on
navigable water, like the plaintiff in that case, has in the shore,
is indicated by Ch.J. HosmER, 7 Conn, 202, in commenting on
a passage in Swift's System. He says: "By this expression
I do not understand that the proprietors alluded to were seised,
but they had a right of occupation, properly termed a franchise."
Those cases were very different from this. Here was no building
upon the plaintiff's land-only an abutting against it by a structure
made. outside of it. It is not a case of accretion or gradual reliction, which belongs to the riparian owner. It does not fall
within the right usque ad ccelum, for that of itself does not often
extend more widely than the 8olum of the owner, on which such
rights must be grounded. Most of the other cases cited by plaintiff's counsel arose with reference to the right to appropriate anduse the shore-the space between high and low water-markwhere the tide. ebbs and flows. As to rights beyond low-water
mark. they countenance and maintain our views in this case. In
Blundell v. Catterall,7 E. C. L. 152, it is shown that the exclusive
right in the plaintiff to the shore of the navigable water in question did not exist, except by grant from the Crown. In that case
the learning on the subject of riparian rights along navigable
waters is exhaustively developed by discussion and citation, and
e: tirely in consonance with the present decision.
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We have examined the cases cited in the U. S. Supreme Court
Reports, and find that none of them maintain a right of soil in the
plaintiffs beyond low-water mark. And that must be maintained,
in order to entitle them to recover in ejectment the made lani in
question. The case of -Dutton et al. v. Strong et al., 1 Black 23,
most confidently urged upon our attention by counsel for plaintiffs, countenances precisely what we hold as to rights beyond lowwater mark.

We cite some passages of the opinion by

CLIFFORD,

J., p. 31, "Bridge-piers and landing-places, &c., are frequently
constructed by the riparian proprietor on the shores of navigable
rivers, bays, &c., as well as on the lakes; and, where they conform
to the regulations of the state, and do not extend below low-water
mark, it has never been held that they were a nuisance, unless it
appeared that they were an obstruction to the paramount right of
navigation." * * "Our ancestors, when they immigrated here,
undoubtedly brought the common law with them; * * but they
soon found it indispensable, in order to secure these conveniences,
to sanction the appropriation of the soil between high and low water
mark to the accomplishment of these objects. Different states
adopted different regulations upon the subject, and, in some, the
right of the riparian proprietor rests upon immemorial local usage.
* * * Wherever the water of the shore (of the lake) is too shoal
to be navigable, there is the same necessity for such erections, as in
bays and arms of the sea; and, where that necessity exists, it is
difficult to see any reason for denying to the adjacent owner the
right to supply it; but the right must be understood as terminating
at the point of navigability, where the necessity for such erections
ordinarily ceases." The question in that case was, whether the
defendants, who had built such a pier on the shore of Lake Miehigan,
had such a property right in it as to entitle them to prevent the
plaintiffs from causing its destruction, by hitching their vessel to it
in stress of weather, a very different question from that of right of
soil in land made by another outside of the testator's water front of
low-water mark into the body of the lake. The other cases cited
need no comment, for it is not claimed that they are more in point
than those noticed above.
According to these views the judgment is reversed, and cause
remanded.
The foregoing opinion presents ques- by ejectment seems to be denied upon
tions of new impression, growing. out two grounds, either of which would b
of the law of railways. The remedy sufficient in itself. 1. The fact that tho
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railway company nad, in the first instance, rightfully applied the land to
their exclusive use. 2. The fact that
the general railway law of the state
provided for assessing land damages
where the company had appropriated
the land without such assessment; and
which, as embracing the present case,
might properly be held exclusive of all
other remedies, with the further provision in the same statute, that where
railway companies had appropriated
land to their use, and had omitted to
have the damages appraised until the
term allowed for such appraisal had
expired, the owner of such land might
have his common-law action against the
company for the value of the land so
This provision of the
appropriated.
statute seems to afford ample remedy for
all damage which the plaintiffs claim to
have sustained in this case ; asd as statutory remedies, in such cases, have
always been held exclusive of all others,
we do not see why this will not effectually dispose of the case. And it seems
to us an eminently just and reasonable
disposition of such a case, and the construction of the statute a very suitable
one, since if the statute were not originally made to embrace precisely this
class of cases, none such having then
occurred ; still its terms being broad
enough to reach this class of cases, and
there being the same reason to apply
the rule'to them as to any other, it evidently comes fairly and fully within the
legitimate scope of the statute, both in
its terms and presumptive spirit and
intent. The construction is therefore
entirely lawful. It is also commendable, inasmuch as it reaches the evident
purpose of the statute, without resort to
emendatory legislation in order to remove doubts resulting oftener from the
speculations of the court than from the
terms used as applied to the subjectmatter.
It seems to us this view is rather

more satisfactory than that which treat,
the case 'as coming within the principle
of the other cases referred to, where the
company have built their road upon the
land by the consent of the owner without
having the damages assessed or agreed
upon by the parties. There is no doubt
a very obvious resemblance in the equity
of the two classes of cases, and a court
of equity would probably feel compelled
to deal with them in the same way. But
there seems more question in regard to
the strict legal rights of the parties,
which is not probably very important,
except as determining which party shall
take the initiative in going into equity.
It is rather difficult for us to see clearly
wherein the plaintiffs have been in fault
in having their land applied to the use
of the railway, or precisely how it can
be clearly shown that the defendants
have rightfully applied the plaintiffs'
land to their own exclusive use. No
doubt the defendants might rightfully do
what they did, at the time of doing it;
but this they did as the owners of the
life-interest, and with the full knowledge of the outstanding title in the
plaintiffs. And we might find some
difficulty in saying, that the mere fact
that there was here no life-estate to be
taken for the use of the railway, presented any insurmountable obstacle in the
way of having the plaintiffs' interest in
a vested remainder condemned for the
use of the railway. We should certainly
find difficulty in reaching any such conclusion unless the phraseology of the
statute clearly necessitated such a construction. Upon general principles of
construction it would therefore be more
natural to treat the defendants as primarily in fault in appropriating the plaintiffs' estate in remainder to the exclusive
use of their railway, without first obtaining the title either by condemnation or
voluntary purchase. But this is all
matter of construction, and the opinion
of the court in regard to the force and

AUSTIN v. RUTLAND RAILROAD CO.
import of the statute is final. We may
therefore conclude, with the court, that
the defendants, under the statutes of the
state, had no power to take the plaintiffs'
interest in the land until after the determination of the life-estate, inasmuch as
having already obtained the latter, there
could be no proceeding to condemn it,
and consequently none to condemn the
estate in remainder. In this view of the
case the defendants did all in their
power to do, in order to obtain the title
of the plaintiffs, until their title in
possession accrued. This construction
seems a very equitable one, and surely
a very convenient one for bringing
about the desired result, viz., allowing
the defendants to retain the land upon
paying its value. For if the court had
adopted the construction of the statute
which we have before indicated as the
more natural upon general principles of
construction, there might have been more
difficulty, upon the decided cases, in
compelling the plaintiffs to relinquish
their title upon the payment of its fair
value. A eourt of equity might have
so dealt with the matter-we certainly
believe they should have done so. But
the court here, with great ingenuity and
equal propriety and justice, as it seems
to us, find the provisions of the general
statutes precisely accommodated to the
peculiar exigencies of this case.
If the view which we have suggested,
as a plausible one upon general principles, had been adopted by the court,
and judgment been given in the ejectmeat to let in the plaintiffs to the enjoyment of their share of the common
property, they might possibly, upon
strictly legal principles, have found themselves in a somewhat embarrassing predicament. For by recognising the
defendants as tenants in common, and
only in the proper use and management
of the estate, they would possibly become
tenants in common of the railway, since
it would be impossible to separate the
particular portion of it resting upon this
V-.. XXI.-28

land from the entire work. If the law
for the severance and destruction of the
common title between tenants in common were the same in regard to real
estate as it is with reference to personalty, we might find some mode of escape
from the embarrassment in treating the
defendants' use of the land as a destruction of the common property, which
would leave the plaintiffs no redress
except to recover the value. Thus in
regard to personalty, where one tenant
converts the common property into something else, as by mixing shot-iron with
other iron, and manufacturing the mixture into various wares, rendering it
impossible to trace the identity, and
then selling the wares, it will amount
to a conversion, and the proper remedy
will be to recover the value of the
tenant's interest: Redington v. Chase,
44 N. H. 36. So also in many of the
more recent cases, especially in this
country, where one tenant in common
of personalty assumes to sell the whole,
it has been held a conversion, giving
the other joint owners a remedy in
damages only: White v. Brooks, 43
N. H. 402 ; Tyler v. Taylor, 8 Barb.
585; Wheeler v. Wheeler, 33 Me. 347 ;
Weld v. Oliver, 21 Pick. 559. The
early cases did not recognise the mere
sale or disposition of the common proparty as amounting to a destruction of
the interest of the other tenants, but as
leaving them to hold in common with
the purchaser: Holliday v. Camsell, I
T. R. 658; Tubbs v. Richardson, 6 Vt.
442; Heath v. Hubbard, 4 East 110;
Fellows v. Lord Greenville, 1 Taunt.
241 ; Oviatt Y. Saqe, 7 Conn. 95
But no such rule has ever been attempted to be applied to real estate held
by tenants in common. The tenant in
possession is presumed to hold for the
joint use of all the tenants, until he
gives unequivocal notice to the contrary,
which will amount to such an ouster, as
to enable them to recover in ejectment to
be let into joint possession: Denp v.
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ShurnIbrg), 4 Y. & C. 42. An ouster
may indeed be presumed after a very
long holding by one tenant, no claim
being made by the others. This was
presumed after thirty-six years, it being
left to the jury to presume an ouster
more than twenty years before suit
brought, and thus quiet the title in the
one so long in possession: Doe v.
So too one
Prosser, 1 Cowp. 217.
tenant in common may have an action for
waste against the one in possession: Co.
Litt. 200 b. So also he may have an
action of account: Co Litt. 172 a, 186
But an action
a, 200; F. N. B. 118.
of ejectment will not lie for cutting
trees of a proper age and growth:
Afart1 n v. KnowIllys, 8 T. R. 145 ;
Petersdorff's Abr. tit. Tenantsin Common.
And even where the Statute of Limitations has run against some of the tenants, those whose rights are saved by
disability will be let in as tenants to
those holding adversely: AfcFarland(s
Adm'r. v. Stone, 17 Vt. 165. So that
it would he difficult to drive the plaintiff
to an action for the value of his estate,
on the ground that the tenant in possession had destroyed the estate by putting
it to the use of a railway.
The second point in the opinion seems
sufficiently disposed of by driving the
plaintiff to his action under the statute
for the value of his estate, on the ground
that the tenant in possession had effectually and permanently deprived him of
i.q use by applying it rightfully to the
use of a railway. He could scarcely exvect to recover the enhanced value

caused by the railway after its appro.
priation to that use. And the argument
of the court seems entirely satisfactory
to show that the filling into the lake
below the low-water mark, under statutory provisions, is, in no sense, an
erection upon tbe land in question, or
in any way creating an accession to the
land, so as to enable the plaintiffs to
recover damages on account of it.
We must therefore conclude, in all
seriousness, that the opinion presents a
most satisfactory disposition of an action, making rather exorbitant demands
under the color of law, and raising some
rather embarrassing questions on the
strict principles of the common law.
We are bound to say also that we always
rejoice to see such results reached, since
we regard it as the duty of courts to so
apply the law as to make it reach the
justice of the case, if at all possible,
without too great departure from established principles. We shohld not feel
much surprised to find the plaintiffs
somewhat indignant to have their expected 1gains brought to so disastrous a.

fate by means of constructions, which to
them will naturally appear more nice
than wise. We hope they will not
attempt to console themselves by any o
rash comparison of the decision with a
somewhat celebrated 31S. case, in the
early practice of the distinguished senator from that state, Hon. Stephen
Roe Bradley, with whom the eminent
counsellor the late Jeremiah Mason
I. F. R.
read law.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.
ELLIS v. BUZZELL.
In actions of slander, where the words charged impute crime, and the defendant
pleads the truth in justification, he must prove the actual offence charged-that is
ne must prove the same 2natters orfacts that would be requisite to convict the plaintiff on trial upon indictment for the crime.
But it is not necessary to prove the facts to theexelusion of all reasonable doubt
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as in criminal cases. It is sufficient if the defendant leaves a fair preponderance
to the minds of the jury in his favor notwithstanding the plaintiff's evidence and
the presumption of innocence.

T.E facts appear in the opinion.
The plaintiff claims to recover damages of tho
BARROWS, J.
defendant, because, he says, the defendant falsely charged him
with the commission of the crime of adultery.
The defendan-t says the plaintiff ought not to recover damages,
because the accusation was not false, but true, and he testifies
that he saw the plaintiff in the act of adultery with a certain
woman. The plaintiff denies this in his testimony, and produces
the deposition of the woman, who denies it also. Hereupon he
requests the judge to instruct the jury that the defendant, in order
to maintain the defence, must prove the act of adultery upon him
beyond a reasonable doubt, the same as if he was on trial for the
commission of the crime.
The judge refused so to instruct, and, on the contrary, instructed
the jury that if the defendant had made out the truth of the charge
against the plaintiff by a preponderance of testimony, it was sufficient to entitle him to a verdict; and that proof of the truth of
the statements made by the defendant would be a complete justification for uttering them.
In suits to recover damages for what is alleged to have been
slander, the truth of the charges made by the defendant against
the plaintiff has always been deemed a sufficient justification, even
though they were maliciously made. We see this in the form and
tenor of the plea in justification which simply asserts the truth of
the words spoken: Went. Pl. vol. 8, p. 236; Chit. Pl. vol. 3, p.
525; Foss v. Hildreth, 10 Allen 76.
Unless the charge made by the defendant against the plaintiff
was false, as well as malicious, the plaintiff has no right to recovez
damages from him. The falsehood of the charge is a necessary
element in the plaintiff's case. He cannot complain of any one
for speaking of him nothing but the truth.
The burden, however, of proving that what he has said is true,
rests rightfully enough upon the defendant, not only because he
holds the affirmative according to the pleadings, but because of the
presumption of innocence. This presumption, as well as whatevei
testimiony the plaintiff may offer to repel the charge, the defendanb
must be prepared to overcome-by evidence.
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But when he has done this by that measure and quantity of evi
dence which is ordinarily held sufficient to entitle a party upoL
whom the burden of proof rests, to a verdict in his favor in a civil
case, shall he be required to go further, and in order to save himself from being mulcted in damages for the benefit of the plaintiff,
free the minds of the jury from every reasonable doubt of the
plaintiff's guilt, as the state must in a criminal prosecution ?
We see no good reason for thus confounding the distinction
which is made by the -best text-writers on evidence, between civil
and criminal cases, -with regard to the degree of assurance which
must be given to the jury as the basis of a verdict: Greenl. on
Ev. vol. 3, § 29; Roscoe's Crim. v.p. 15; Best on Presumptions, § 190; Starkie on Ev., 1st Am. ed., Part 3, § 52, vol. 2,
pp. 450, 451.
It is true, that this distinction has heretofore been carried into
civil cases and applied to suits in which it incidentally became
necessary to determine, in order to settle the issue which the parties were litigating, whether one of-the parties had committed an
offence against the criminal law. Hence have arisen in these actions for defamation among others, a series of decisions which, if.
juries had acted according to their tenor, would have been productive not unfrequently of very unjust results.
Practically we do not consider the form of expression used in
the b structions to juries in cases of this description as very likely
to change the result. We do not believe, if the jury in the present case found themselves inclined to believe upon the whole evidence that the plaintiff was verily guilty, as the defendant had said,
that they would have proceeded to assess damages in his favor,
because he might have started a reasonable doubt in their minds
whether he ought to be convicted of the crime and sent to the
state prison, upon that evidence, even had they been so instructed.
The practical effect of such an instruction would probably have
been to eliminate the doubt from the minds of the jury, not to
change the result at which they arrived.
But we think it best to recognise what has been justly said to be
"well understood, that a jury will not require so strong proof to
maintain a civil action as to convict of a crime ;" and to draw the
line between the cases where full proof beyond a reasonable doubt
shall be required, and those where a less degree of assurance may
sorve as the basis of a verdct, where the juror instinctively places
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it, making it to depend rather upon the results which are to follow
the decision, than upon a philosophical analysis of the character
of the issue. We must remember, as remarked by Roscoe ubi supra,
that " in civil cases it is always necessary for a jury to decide the
question at issue between the parties; . . . however much, there-

fore, they may be perplexed, they cannot escape from giving a verdict founded upon one view or the other of the conflicting facts before them; presumptions, therefore, are necessarily made upon comparatively weak grounds. But, in criminal cases, there is always a
result open to the jury which is practically looked upon as merely
negative, namely, that which declares the accused to be not guilty."
This is often substantially deemed equivalent only to "not
proven," and in cases of doubt it is to this view that juries are
taught to lean.
A greater degree of caution in coming to a conclusion should be
practised to guard life or liberty against the consequences of a
mistake always painful, and possibly irreparable, than is necessary
in civil cases, where, as above remarked, the issue must be settled
in accordance with one 'view or the other, and the verdict is
followed with positive results to one party or the other, but not f
so serious a nature. In England there was a reason for carrying
the distinction thus m'ade between civil and criminal cases, into
suits of this description,-which never existed here,-because
there, as Lord Kenyon remarked in Cook v. Field, 3 Esp. 133,
"where a defendant justifies words which amount to a charge of
felony, and proves his justification, the plaintiff may be put upon
his trial by that verdict without the intervention of a grand jury ;"
and so penal consequences might in some sort be said to follow the
verdict in a civil cause. See note (a) to Wilmot v. Harmer, 8 Car.
& P. 695, in 34 E. C. L. R. 590, and cases there cited.
Considering the universal presumption in favor of innocence, and
the fact that whether it is presented directly, on the criminal side,
or arises incidentally on the civil side, it is still the same questionguilty or not guilty-which is to be determined, it is not at all
strange that those English decisions should have been followed in
this country, though the reasons that operated there were wanting.
But we think it time to limit the application of a rule which was
originally adopted in favorem vitce in the days of a sanguinary
penal code, to cases arising on the criminal docket, and no longer
to suffer it to obstruct or encumber the action of juries in civil
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suits sounding only in damages. Nor in so doing do we deprive
the plaintiff in an action of this sort of any substantial right. It
is doubtless incumbent upon the defendant to "make out" (as the
phrase was in the ruling here complained of), i. e. to satisfy the
minds of the jury by a preponderance of evidence of the strict
truth of the words he uttered. And the plaintiff is entitled to the
full benefit of the presumption of innocence; for as was justly
suggested by WALTON, J., in Knowles v. Scribner, 57 Maine 497
(where we held the complainant in a bastardy process against a
married man not bound to furnish the same amount of proof of the
defendant's guilt, as would be necessary to convict him if he
were on trial for adultery, in order to entitle herself to a verdict
and contribution from the father of her bastard child), "it is more
accurate to say that there is no preponderance unless the evidence
is sufficient to overcome the opposing presumptions as well as the
opposing evidence."
If the words said to be slanderous impute to- the plaintiff the
commission of a crime, the defendan't must fasten upon the plaintiff all the elements of the crime, both7 in act and intent, and to
do this he must furnish evidence enough to overcome, in the minds
of the jury, the natural presumption of innocence, as well as the
opposing testimony. But to go further, and say that this shall be
done by such a degree and quantity of proof as shall suffice to
remove from their minds every reasonable doubt that might be suggested, is to import into the trial of civil causes between party and
party a rule which is appropriate only in the trial of an issue between the state and a person charged with crime and exposed to
penal consequences if the verdict is against him.
The doctrine contended for by the plaintiff did not prevail in
the courts of New Hampshire or North Carolina: Milatthews v.
Huntley, 9 N. H. 150, per PARKER, C. J.; Folsom v. Brown, 5
Foster 122; Kineade v. Bradshaw, 3 Hawk. 63.
It is worthy of remark, that, with a very few unimportant exceptios, the cases in which it has been 'held, that to sustain a plea
of justification the defendant in an action of slander must adduce
such proof as would suffice for the conviction of the plaintiff upon
an indictment, have been cases in which the words used imputed
perjury to the plaintiff, and in most of them, the matter more
directly under consideration, has been the propriety of regarding
the plaintiff's testimony upon the occasion referred to, as evidence
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fn the case, to be overcome by the production of more than one
witness to prove its falsity-the necessity of showing that his
testimony was false in intent as well as in fact-its materiality
3r some point affecting the truth of the charge, and not the necessity of proving the commission of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.
We have no occasion to question those decisions so far as they
enforce the necessity of proving all the elements necessary to constitute the crime charged by an amount of evidence sufficient to overbalance the plaintiff's side of the case.
It "may be, and probably is true, that the compendious phrase,
"sufficient to convict the plaintiff upon an indictment," has had
reference more frequently to the matters which it was necessary to
establish, than to the degree of assurance upon which the jury
should act.
In our own case of Newbit v. Statuck, 85 Iaine 318, the consideration of the precise question here raised was studiously and
expressly avoided.
Exceptions overruled.
The question decided in the foregoing
opinion, is one of considerable importance in point of principle, as well as in
practice. And the decision, although
contrary to a very general impression
among the profession in this country, is,
we have long been satisfied, the only
consistent view of the law. The general
statement in the English cases, that the
same evidence must be adduced as would
be necessary to convict the plaintiff
upon an indictment for the crime, as
found in Calmers v. Shackell, 6 Car.
& P. 475, and which is made the basis
of Prof. Greenleaf's text, 2 Ev. 426,
has led to the conclusion, without much
examination or reflection, we think, that
full proof was also required, as in criminal cases. But there seems no just
cause for making this exception to the
general rule ih civil actions. The rule
in criminal cases seems to be one of
policy merely, in order to save the possibility of mistake; since the consequences of the mistake are so serious,

and so incurable. It seems to restupon the
same basis as the maxim of Lord Coxa,
that it is better that any number of guilty
persons should escape punishment, than
that one innocent one should suffer unjustly. As the consequences of a verdict in the class of cases in the principal
case are confined to the particular action,
there seems no reason for adopting a rule
of such extreme caution, as is very proper in criminal cases. There follow
none of the legal consequences of a conviction for crime. It works no legal
incapacity or disqualification. It entails
no punishment and no legal discredit,
and scarcely more moral discredit than
the general repute from which the alleged
slander might have arisen. The general discredit to the plaintiff of a verdict against him is bcarcely more than
of a verdict against the defendant of
having maliciously attered the slander
without any just groune for believing
the charge.
We cannot find that this precise ques-
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tion has ever been raised in any English
case. The late edition of Taylor's Evidence contains no intimation of any such
rule. Mr. Greenleaf, in his text, states
the proposition as a mere speculation of
his own. "And it is conceived, that he
would be entitled to the benefit of any
reasonable doubts of his guilt." But he
quotes no authority directly to the point
from any English case, which he always
does when one in point exists. He cites
only one English ease for his whole section upon this point, which he expresses
in the very terms already quoted from
Chalmers v. Shackell. In that case the
crime charged was forgery, and at the
trial TiNDAL, Ch. J., told the jury, "If
the defendants have proved to your satisfaction, that the plaintiff was guilty,"
&c. In the later case of WilImett v.
Harner, 8 C. & P. 695, the charge was
bigamy, and Lord Ch. J. DENMAN said
to the jury, "I think, on the plea of
justification, you should have the same
strictness of proof as on a trial for
bigamy. However that proof has been
brought before you, as there is evidence
of the actual marriage," thus showing
very clearly what his lordship meant by
" the same strictness of proof"-the
same kind of proof-not mere cohabitation, as evidence of the marriage, but
proof of the fact of marriage. This is no
doubt true in the proof of all crimes in
such cases. Perjury must be established
by something more than the testimony
of one witness, in order to produce a
preponderance against the plaintiff's evidence: Hicks v. Rising, 24 Ill. 566. In
Fero v. Rusco, 4 N. Y. 162, BRONSON,
C. J., said, " The justification must be
as broad as the charge" and of the same
identical offence. That is, half proof or
proof of something else, will not avail.
The learned judge here rouses himself to
Such a pitch of righteous indignation
,gainst slanderers, as to declare that an"
attempt to justify, in court, by proof, of
the truth and failure, must be regarded
as an aggravation of the slander; and

some other judges have taken the same
high ground. But no such rule is now
maintainable: Rayner v. Kinney, 14
Ohio N. S. 283.
Mr. Townshend, in his late work on
Slander, lays down the rule, in proving
a justification, alleging crime against
plaintiff. "That the same degree of
evidence" * * is required "as would
be necessary to convict plaintiff." But
he adds, "IAt least the defendant must
prove the crime to the satisfaction of the
jury," citing Knight v. .Zbster, 39 N. H.
576. And this learned writer cites, as
requiring full proof, "beyond reasonable doubt :" Shortly v. Mfiller, I Smith
395, and Tall v. David, 27 Ind. 377.
And some other cases in that state require proof of the crime, beyond reasonable doubt. There are other American
cases which seem to require this: Fountain v. West, 23 Iowa 9. But most of
them do not embrace the very point.
There is an early case in Vermont: Torrey v. Field, 10 Vt. 353, where the point
of pleading the truth in justification and
the degree of strictness required, is extensively discussed, both by counsel and
court, which will apply equally to the
strictness of proof. It is there said, "If
defendant justify, by pleading the truth,
he must plead the truth of the very
charge; and it is not sufficient to plead
one of a similar character, although of
the same, or even greater enormity."
The cases are very numerous in uits
country, bearing upon the question decided in the principal case, and we cannot claim to have carefully examined
them all ; this is more than could fairly
be expected of any one, who has any
other claims upon his time. But we are
satisfied no other rule of evidence has
ever been required in the English practice, than the one declared in the prin-.
cipal case. And we trust the time is
near, when the American courts will
enforce the same reasonable and just
I. F. R.
view.

THOMAS v. MAONE.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
B. G. THOMAS v. R. D. MAHONE.
Where a citizen of Kentucky leaves his home and enters the service of the
Confederate States, the presumption is that his sympathy is with the Southern
cause, and to rebut this he must show that such absence from home was enforced.
The civil code of Kentucky authorizes the creditors of a citizen who leaves the
county of his residence and remains absent thirty days within the Confederate
lines, to attach his property and sell the same for payment of their debts.
The fact that the debtor was a soldier in the Confederate army, would no: deprive the court of jurisdiction under the code.
When the premises are used as an encampment by the Federal Government,
and notice of the attachment is served on the officer in command, the attachment

will be valid.
When the legislature provides for constructive notice on absent debtors, such
notice if given, is sufficient to give the courts jurisdiction and their judgment will
be sustained.

THPE facts are fully set forth in the opinion of the court.
LINDSAY, J.-B. G. Thomas, a citizen of Kentucky residing in
,he city of Lexington, some time in the early part of the year
1862 became embroiled in an unfortunate difficulty with a soldier
of one of the regimen ts of United States troops, then stationed
at that place, and was finally compelled, in necessary self-defence,
to kill the soldier. The act was held to be excusable by both the
civil and military authorities, but the comrades of the deceased
soldier were so much incensed, that they openly announced their
intention to avenge his death, and made repeated attempts to
execute their threats. Their officers either could not or would
not restrain them, and it became necessary that Thomas should
virtually abandon his business to escape the impending danger.
While affairs were in this condition, the Southern army under
General Bragg advanced into Kentucky and occupied the city of
Lexington. During its occupation, Thomas remained at home,
but a day or two after it was abandoned by the retiring Con
federates, and before the Federal army resumed possession, ho
started south, and sometime in November 1862, he (being then
in the state of Tennessee) joined the Confederate army.
On the 5th of November 1862, Rufus Lisle, a creditor of
Thomas, brought his suit in the Fayette Circuit Court, and sued
out orders of attachment against his property, upon the grounds,
that he had left the county of his residence for the purpose of
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joining, and had joined and entered into, and was then, in the
service of the army of the so-called Confederate States, and that
he had removed, and was about to remove a material part of his
property out of Kentucky, not leaving enough to pay his debts.
*The real and personal estate of Thomas situated or found in
Fayette county was shortly thereafter seized by the sheriff. On
the 14th of December, James and Mansfield also filed their suit to
enforce the collection of certain notes held by them as assignee of
Jackson, the payment of which was secured by a vendor's lien on
a tract of about one hundred acres of land, situated near the city
of Lexington, and purchased by Thomas from Jackson. They
also procured an order of attachment upon the alleged ground that
their debtor had voluntarily left the county of his residence and
gone within the lines of the Confederate army, and there voluntarily remained for more than thirty days.
In both these suits the land was attached, and in each of them
orders of warning against the absent defendant were duly made.
In February 1863, the two suits were consolidated and a judgment rendered, directing amongst other things the sale of this
tract of land. The proceeds arising therefrom to be applied first
to the satisfaction of the lien notes held by James and Mansfield,
and then to the payment of such balance as might remain unpaid
on the claim of Lisle after the sale of the personal property.
Under this judgment the land was sold; the appellee, Mahone,
purchasing it for the sum of $10,613. The sale was confirmed,
and with the sanction and approval of the court a conveyance to
Mahone was executed by thle sheriff (who acted as the court commissioner) on the 17th of June 1864. Shortly after the termination of the civil war, Thomas returned to his home and on the
21st of April 1870 instituted this suit, seeking to have the judgment and sale under which Mahone claims title to the land declared
void, the land restored to his possession, and judgment for such
amount as might be found due him after an account for rents and
Improvements should be rendered.
He alleges that at the time of the proceedings resulting in the
sale of his land, he w.s kept away from his home and prevented
from making defence by the lawless condition of the country, and
the inability of the civil, and- the disinclination of the military
authorities to protect him from threatened assassination.
That Mahone the purchaser had contributed to bring about the
condition of lawlesness then prevailing, and was thereby.indirectly
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responsible for his (appellant's) enforced absence. That the levies
of the orders of attachments, were as matters of law void, because
of the failure of the officer to comply with the law in making them,
and because the land was, at the time, in the actual possession of
the military authorities of the United States, and therefore not
subject to seizure by the officer of the state court. That the military
authorities intimidated bidders and prevented competition in the
sale. That this fact was a matter of public notoriety, and was
well known to the purchaser, who took advantage of it to bid in
the land for greatly less than its actual value.
That the premises were in the actual possession of the military
when sold, and finally that the judgment was void for the want of
jurisdiction in the court, it not having power, because of his belligerent character, and of his absence within the lines of an hostile
government, to bring him before it by constructive service.
No appeal was prosecuted from the original judgment confirming
the sale of the land. Nor did appellant within five years after
judgment or sale, enter his appearance and ask a re-trial of the
issues settled by either the original judgment or the confirmation
of the sale as authorized by section 445 of the Civil Code of Practice. Nor is this action in the nature of a bill of review. It is in
every essential a collateral proceeding seeking no correction of
errors, and asking no relief except that the original proceedings
shall be absolutely ignored.
Such being the case, it is not necessary that we should direct
attention to any of the grounds set up in the petition, which will
not of themselves, or in connection with others, authorize us to
conclude that the judgment or the sale or both were and are utterly
null and void.
That in 1862, the civil authorities of Fayette county were not
able to protect appellant from the soldiery, and that the military
officers did not afford him protection, is sufficiently proved, yet the
hostility towards him seems not to have extended beyond the friends
and comrades of the man who had been killed, and it is certain that
he remained at home notwithstanding the apprehended danger,
until the command to which these soldiers belonged, was compelled
to withdraw from Lexington, by the advance -of the Southern
troops.
He started south at a time when he was in no immediate danger,
and when he had no sufficient reason to anticipate the return to
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Lexington of the hostile soldiers, if indeed they ever did return.
But even if prudence dictated that he should secure his personal
safety by leaving his home, he could have obtained the security as
well within as without the Federal lines. We are constrained to
conclude that whilst he would have preferred to remain at home,
1f he could have been assured that he would be permitted to do so
without further molestation, it was his sympathy for the Southern
cause, and not fear of the soldiery, that induced him to go south.
Appellant's absence within the Confederate lines was not that
character of enforced absence which in the case of Dean v. .Xelson,
10 Wall. 158, was held by the Supreme Court of the United
States to render void the order of publication by which the Civil
Commission sitting at Memphis attempted to acquire jurisdiction
of the persons of Nelson and wife. They had been expelled the
Union lines by the military commander, and were not allowed to
return, and therefore could not have obeyed the order of publication, even if it had been brought to their notice.
There is nothing in the record before us authorizingthe conclusion that Mahone was responsible for the lawlessness-complained of
by Thomas, nor that he personally contributed to bring about that
disregard by the military of law and order, which it is insisted
prevailed in Lexington in 1862 and afterward.
This court cannot recognise and act upon the idea that there is
a general equity growing out of the disturbed condition of Kentucky during the late civil war, which of itself converts into trustees those who purchased property at judicial sales made during
that period. To uphold such a doctrine would be to practically
reopen all the litigation settled by the courts during that unhappy
epoch in our country's history.
Although the witness Lisle, who was one of the attaching creditors, and who seems to have been -the friend of appellant, was
induced by information that he was to be arrested by the military
authorities, to leave Lexington on the day of the judicial sale
instead of remaining and bidding for the land as he intended to do;
the evidence does not show that his contemplated arrest had anything to do with the sale, nor that it had the effect of intimidating
bidders. Nor is there any proof tending even remotely to connect Mahone with it. The return of the deputy sheriff upon the
order of attachment sued out by Lisle is to the effect that it was
levied on "about 100 acres of land by delivering a true copy of
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the within order of attachment to W. A. Warner on the premises,"
and on that of Tames and Mansfield. That it was executed "by
lelivering to W. A. Warner a true copy of the within order of
attachment on the premises of B. G. Thomas."
The 228th section of the Civil Code provides that real property
shall be attached "by leaving with the occupants thereof, or, if
there be no occupant, in a conspicuous place thereon, a copy of
the order."
The returns of the sheriff do not show that W. A. Warner was
the occupant of the land, but there is nothing in either of them
from which it can be inferred that he was not. In such a state of
case the presumption must be indulged that the officer made the
levies in the mode pointed out by the law, and that the person to
whom the copies of the orders of attachment were delivered was
the occupant of the premises: Lewis v. Juniper,2 Mete. 284; and
especially should this presumption prevail where the levies are
attacked collaterally, it not being permissible in an action of that
kind to allow the officer to amend his return as he would be
allowed to do if the attack had been made in the action in which
the attachments were sued out. A different rule would work
irreparable mischief; no one would purchase attached property if
parties were allowed,* in subsequent and collateral litigation, to
re-try the questions of fact which were or might have been contested in the original proceedings.
We axe of the opinion that the premises were subject to attachment, notwithstanding the Federal Government had upon them at
the time a military encampment. The occupation of the military was
merely temporary. The General Government asserted no claim to
the land actually occupied, and had done nothing indicative of an
intention to seize and permanently hold the premises in the
furtherance of military operations.
Although the officer of the state could not force his way within
the guard-lines of the military encampment, yet the occupation of
the army was not so exclusive as to prevent him from doing suca
acts as the law required to be done to put the court in constructive possession of the land, and that was all that was necessary to
perfect the attachment-liens.
If it be true as charged, that Warner, to whom the deputy
Bheriff delivered copies of the orders of attachment, was a Federal
officer, it is equally clear that he recognised the right of the
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deputy to make the levies; and it seems from the testimony ot
appellant's witness, Merrill held possession of the dwelling under
the officer of the state court, and surrendered to the purchaser at
the decretal sale. The seizure by the state court did not interfere
with the encampment of the Federal troops, and the concurrent
possession of the state court and these troops was in nowise inconsistent with the rights of either. We do not regard the temporary
encampment established on appellant's farm as such a possession
by the Federal Government as to compel the process of the state
court to pause until the encampment should be discontinued.
There is no analogy between the facts involved in this and in the
cases of Harrisv. -Dennej, 3 Peters 292, and Amey v. Supervisors,
11 Wall. 138.
The further objection that the returns of the officer upon the
orders of attachment do not sufficiently describe the land to identify it, however well founded it may be as to the attachment of
Lisle, cannot avail in this suit. The entire amount for which the
land sold was required to pay the lien-notes held by James & Mansfield, and for the satisfaction of these notes. The court had jurisdiction to sell it, independent of the lien attempted to be created by
its actual seizure, under the order of attachment sued out by them.
The remaining questions to be noticed are: 1st. Could the
Fayette circuit- entertain jurisdiction of, and render judgment in
an action prosecuted against Thomas whilst he was a soldier in the
Confederate army ? 2d. Did the orders of varning taken out against
him have the legal effect of constructive service of process ?
It does not follow, because appellant was at the time a soldier in
the army of a belligerent power, and that all unlicensed communication with him by the people of the states adhering to the Federal
Union was inhibited, not only by the laws of war, but by express
statute, that resident creditors might not sue him in the courts
of this state, and subject to the judgment of their debts such of
his property as might be found within the local jurisdiction of the
courts in which he was sued.
The right of resident creditors so to proceed against parties indebted to them residing within the lines of the hostile power, and
held to be public enemies by reason of their participation in the
Southern movement, was recognised by the Federal Congress in the
Act of March 3d 1863 (2d Brightly's Digest 1238), providing for
the seizure and confiscation of the property of such persons.
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In the case of Crutcher v. Hurd and wife, 4 Bush 868, this
court held that a proceeding by a Kentucky creditor to enforce
his lien on land situated in -this state was not interdicted, notwithstanding the existence of the war and the residence of the debtors
within the Confederate lines. And in the case of Burnam v. Commonwealth, 1 Davall 210, an act of the legislature, authorizing
suits against the members of the provisional government of Kentucky for the recovery of public revenues seized by them, or those
claiming to act under them, and the rendition of personal judgments upon constructive service, was declared to be liable to no
constitutional objection, although it applied to persons whose absence
from the state, within the Confederate lines, was as notorious as
was the additional fact that they were engaged, when the act was
passed (March 15th 1862), in giving active aid and encouragement
to the hostile government of the South.
If the state could authorize such proceedings in its own behalf,
without contravening the war policy of the General Government,
or infringing upon its war powers under the Federal Constitution,
it is clear that it could provide the same or similar remedies for
its citizens. Such has all the while been the opinion of this court,
as is manifested by its action in the cases of Beflv. Hall,2 Duvall
288; Anderson v. Satton, Id. 282; Beazley v. .aret, 1 Bush 467;
Lusk v. Salter,2 Bush 201; Crutchfield v. Thurman, 4 Bush 498,
and in numerous others. Even if a citizen of Kentucky, who joined
the Confederate army, became thereby invested with the character of
an alien enemy, as is insisted by appellant, it is by no means clear
that his property in Kentucky could not be lawfully seized by its
courts, and subjected to the payment of his debts.
The Supreme Court of the United States, upon the authority af
a case in the English Court of Exchequer cited, in the case of Albritche v. Seiseman,-2 Vesey and Beames 324, and the doctrine
enunciated in Bacon's Abridgment, title Alien, D., and the 53d
section of Story's Equity Pleading, decides that "whatever may
be the extent of the disability of an alien enemy to sue in the
courts of the hostile country, it is clearthat he is liableto be sued:"
Me Veigh v. United States, 11 Wall. 259.
The jurisdiction of the courts of Tennessee to sell the lands of
one of her citizens who had left his home and became a participant in the war being waged against the United States by the
Confederates, was directly called in question in the case of Lud-

THOMAS v. MAHONE.

low v. Bamsey, 11 Wall. 581, and was upheld by the Supreme
Court.
The judgment in the case of Dean v. Velson was declared
void, because the defendants were not permitted by the military
commander to return to Memphis and make defence. The order
of publication was held to be an idle form, not on account of Nelson and wife being public enemies, and therefore not liable to be
ued, but because the military would neither allow them to see nor
obey it. So far as the civil or military authorities in Kentucky
were concerned, Thomas could have returned and resumed his
status as a non-combatant citizen at any time, but he did not
choose to do so upon the terms prescribed:
We are satisfied that the power of the courts of the states adhering to the Federal TUnion to entertain jurisdiction of suits against
such of their citizens as joined the Confederate army, is upheld by
the decided weight of authority.
The validity of the orders of warning made against Thomas
depends upon whether the laws of Kentucky regulating the mode of
constructive service of process were observed. By an Act of the
General Assembly approved December 28d 1861, service in the
Confederate army, or voluntarily leaving the county of one's residence and remaining absent therefrom thirty days within the Confederate States, or their military lines, or voluntarily leaving the
county of one's residence for the purpose of joining the army of the
Confederate States, or for the purpose of entering their service in
either a civil or military capacity, and remaining absent so that
the ordinary process of the court could not be served for thirty
days, were made grounds of attachment. Said act also provided
that warning orders might be obtained on either of said grounds
against any defendant to whom they might apply, "in the same
manner and with the same effect in all respects and subject to the
same proceedings as (are now) were then had for existing causes
of constructive service." The 91st section of the Civil Code of
practice then and now in force provides " That a defendant against
whom a warning order has been made shall be deemed constructively summoned on the thirtieth day after the making of the order,
and the action may proceed accordingly."
That this act was harsh in its- nature and calculated to result in
toe perpetration of wrongs upon persons, who from the very nature
of things, could not be actually notified of the pendency of suits
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tgainst them, may be conceded, and yet it does not follow that the
ourts could rightfully refuse to enforce it.
As persons serving in the Confederate army or adhering to the
onfederate cause could be lawfully sued, the constructive notice
icessary to give the courts jurisdiction to render judgments in
tits instituted against them, was a question of legislative discretion
id not of power: Burnam v. Commonwealth. As the act was
,tended to apply to belligerents, to persons who were within the
nes of the public enemy, the fact that attorneys appointed to de,nd could not lawfully communicate with them, does not render
oid the judgments in such actions.
That they could not be notified, was doubtless one of the reasons
aducing the legislature to pass the act. It should also be borne
n mind, that whilst the 440th section of the Code provides, that
'Before judgment is rendered against a defendant constructively
mmmoned, and -who has not appeared, it shall be necessary" to
appoint an attorney to defend sixty days before judgment, and to
execute to the defendant a bond to the effect that if he appears
within the time prescribed by law, makes defence and sets aside the
judgment, the plaintiff shall restore the property taken under it if
the same shall be adjudged to be restored, and pay such sums of
money as may be awarded; the appointment of P' , attorney, and
the execution of the bond, are for the protection of the interests of
the absent defendant, and not to give the court jurisdiction. The
jurisdiction is acquired thirty days after the order of warning is
made. It is at that time that the defendant is deemed to be constructively summoned: Section 91 Civil Code. The local jurisdiction of the court over the thing sought to be sold, and the
jurisdiction acquired over the person of the defendant by the constructive service of process provided by law, authorizes the court
to proceed, and although the failure to appoint the attorney or to
take the bond as required by section 440 are reversible errors, the
jurisdiction being complete the judgment will not be void: Bodley's Heirs v. Norris, MS. Opinion, Act 1857.
The attorney to defend is required to correspond with the defendant if he can be found, but his failure so to do, merely deprives
him of the right to compensation, and does not affect the validity
of the steps taken by the court: Brown v. Early, 2 Duvall 372.
The warning orders resulting in the judgment by virtue of whicn
appellant's land was sold; were based upon the alleged ground, that
-r
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he had departed from the county of his residence, and voluntarily

gone within and continued within the lines of the Confederato
States. The evidence establishes the truth of these allegations.
It does not matter that Thomas remained at home until the advance of Bragg's troops brought him within the lines of the invading army He continued a non-combatant citizen of Kentucky,
until the Confederates left Lexington on their retreat from the
state. Whether his remaining at home until the day after the
Southern troops had retired, brought him again within the military
lines of the advancing Federals, or whether his home continued
constructively within the Southern lines until the Union troops
actually re-occupied the country, we do not deem it necessary to
decide. He left his home when there was no public enemy present
to interfere with the execution of the process of the courts, and by
voluntarily continuing absent and within the hostile lines, he forced
his creditors to resort to the remedies provided by a law enacted
before he was in any way connected with the Confederate army.
His conduct brought him within the letter as well as the spirit
of the law, construing it as strictly and confining its operation
within the narrow limits insisted upon by his learned counsel. The
judgment of the Circuit Court dismissing appellant's petition
must be affirmed.
This cause was decided by Judge PRYal whilst a circuit judge,
hence he took no part in this judgment.

District Court of the City of Philadelphia.
MOUNTJOY

TO THE uSp OF

HOLBROOK v. METZGER.

Where a contract is to be performed on a certain day, an unqualified refusAl of
performance, during any part of that day, is a breach, and the other party may
iecover his damages.
Suit for the breach, commenced on the same day but after the refusal to perform,
is not premature.

THIS was an action of assumysit on a written contract of sale,
by which Mountjoy agreed to.deliver and Metzger to take and pay
for 500 barrels of petroleum "between April 14th and December
81st 1869, both days included, at buyer's option," at 88 cents
per gallon.
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Mountjoy subsequently assigned his interest in the contract to
Holbrook. The buyer did not exercise his option, and the agreement consequently became absolute on his part to accept and pay
for the oil on the 31st of December. On that day Holbrook tendered the oil to the defendant. The price had fallen, and the
tender was peremptorily declined. Metzger said that Mountjoy
was in prison and could not have fulfilled the agreement if oil had
risen. He could not, therefore, reasonably expect the defendant
to comply. The tender was all right, but he, Metzger, would neither
take the oil nor pay the difference. Holbrook then said that he
supposed he was bound to sell the oil at auction. If, however, the
defendant was willing, he would place it in the hands of Mr. Foster, to be disposed of at private sale. Metzger replied that he had
no objection. Holbrook thereupon sold the oil at once through
Foster for 31+ cents per gallon, and this suit was instituted to his
use on the same day, for the difference between this amount aiid
the contract price.
The jury were instructed that the writ was prematurely issued,
unless the defendant had waived his right as originally fixed by
the agreement. If, however, he refused absolutely to take the oil,
and assented to the defendant's suggestion that it should be sold
forthwith, as a means 6f liquidating the damages and fixing the
rights and liabilities of the parties, the cause of action was complete immediately on the sale, and a suit brought subsequently on
the same day would not be too soon. Under this instruction the
jury found a verdict for the plaintiff. This was now a rule for a
new trial.
J. T. -Prattand B. P. WTite, for plaintiff.
J. H. Sloan and John Goforth, for defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HARE, P. J.-The charge was excepted to, and is now before
us for consideration. It is said on behalf of the defence that
when an agreement is made for the sale of merchandise deliverable at a future day, the purchaser has the whole of the day to
accept and pay for the goods, and the vendor to deliver them.
Hence the contract cannot be broken on either side before night.
and a writ issued on the same day is premature.
The plaintiff replies, that while this is true as a general propo.
sitio n, still a declaration that the purchaser will not accept or pay
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for the goods is a breach for which redress may be sought imme.
diately by suit.
The question was critically examined in Hochster v. De la Tour,
2 Ell. &Bl. 678. The declaration averred a mutual agreement on
the 12th of April 1852, that the plaintiff should serve the defendant as a courier for three months from a certain day then tc come,
to wit, the 1st of June 1852. That the plaintiff was ready and
willing to comply with the agreement, but that the defendant after
wards, and before the said 1st of June, wrongfully refused and
declined to employ the plaintiff, and wrongfully absolved and discharged him from the said agreement and from the performance
thereof, and from being ready and willing to fulfil the same; and
that the defendant then and there wholly broke, put an end to,
and determined his said promise and engagement. It appeared,
from the evidence given at the trial, that the agreement was made
as alleged in the declaration. That on the 11th of May 1852, the
defendant wrote to the plaintiff that he had changed his mind and
would not take the plaintiff into his service. The latter thereupon
brought suit on the 22d of May, and subsequently, during the
same moftth, obtained an engagement with Lord Ashburton, on
equally good terms, but not commencing until the 4th of July.
The defendant contended the suit was prematurely brought, if not
radically defective. There could not be a breach before the time
designated for performance, nor could a contract be enforced by
any one who did not hold himself in readiness to fulfil his part.
By taking an engagement from Lord Ashburton in May the plaintiff had disabled himself from entering the defendant's service on
the 1st of June.
Mr. Justice ERLE reserved the point; and the case was subsequently argued before the court in bane, on a rule to show cause
why a nonsuit should not be entered or the judgment arrested.
The defendant's counsel alleged that to constitute a breach bf
contract something must be left undone which the promissor
agreed to do, or something done which he promised to avoid.
Saying beforehand that he does not intend to fulfil the agreement.
is not a breach, because he may change his mind when the time
for performance arrives. The injury inflicted by the defendant's
declaration that he would not employ or pay the plaintiff, was
prospective, not actual, and could not be made the foundation of
a suit. The plaintiff was entitled to nothing under the contract
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until the day appointed for its fulfilment. In reply, the plaintiff's
counsel insisted on the hardship that would result if a vendor who
agrees to deliver goods at a future day were obliged to hold them
in the face of a falling market, notwithstanding a notice that the
buyer would not fulfil the contract; or if a manufacturer who has
entered on the fulfilment of an order which is unjustifiably revoked, must proceed on pain of forfeiting the right to compensation for what he has already done.
Lord CAMPBELL said, in delivering judgment, that it was established under the authorities, that if a man disabled himself from
performing the contract, although before the time appointed for
its fulfilment, there was a breach for which the other party might
proceed forthwith. The law had been so held where a man who
had promised to marry at a future day, took another woman as
his wife during the interval. So a tenant might sue at once if the
landlord precluded the fulfilment of his promise to renew the lease,
by letting the premises to a third person before the expiration of
the term.
The principle was analogous where the refusal of one party to
perform the contract, took away the only ground on which the
other could reasonably be expected to hold himself in readiness to
fulfil his part of the agreement. An author who had promised to
write a book could not be expected to go on with the work, after
being informed that the publisher would not defray the cost of
printing it or pay the stipulated compensation. In like manner
the plaintiff could not justly be required to keep himself disengaged in order to be able to attend on the defendant, after being
told that the latter did not need and would not accept his services.
It was obviously for the interest of both parties-of the party who
refused to fulfil the contract, and of the party to whom the refusal
was addressed-that the latter should be permitted to reduce the
damages by taking his skill and time to the best market instead
of charging the other with the whole weight of the obligation
which he had renounced. The same principle was applied in
Zenos v. The Black Sea Co., 18 C. B., N. S. 825.
These decisions go further than the plaintiff's case requires.
The verdict may be sustained without holding that a contract is
necessarily broken by a declaration that it will not be fulfilled.
It is enough to say, that a breach will occur, if such a declaration
results in a loss for which compei sation should be made in dam-
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ages. It may well be, that a purchaser who has announced that
he will not pay the price, may change h1is mind and claim the
goods if they are still on hand when the day arrives, and susceptible of being delivered. If this is conceded, it must follow that
such a retraction on his part would preclude a recovery by the
vendor, who could not be entitled to damages in the absence of
loss. But the case is widely different where the goods are sold in
consequence of the purchaser's declaring that he does not want
and will not pay for them. The transaction is then brought to a
point which does not admit of change; and as the damages are
liquidated, it would obviously be unjust to delay the remedy. This
argument applies with peculiar force when the purchaser rejects
the goods when tendered at the time prescribed.
It cannot be said that such a refusal is a mere declaration of
intention as distinguished from an actual breach. It is no doubt
true that the parties have the whole of the last twenty-four hours during which to perform the agreement. Hence a buyer to whom the
goods are offered at noon, may require the vendor to keep them in
readiness till night, to give him time to procure and pay the purchase-money. But an unqualified refusal on his part is an irreparable breach which leaves no room for a subsequent change of
purpose. It is an implied authority to the vendor to dispose of
the property to the best advantage, and charge the purchaser with
the difference.
In the present case, however, we are not left to inference, becausE
the question, whether the goods should be sold at private sale, was
put to the defendant and answered affirmatively. He is therefore
estopped from alleging that it was the duty of the plaintiff to wait
till the next day before treating the contract as determined.
A question remains of some importance. Conceding that the
contract was irrevocably broken, by the refusal of the defendant to
take the oil, could the plaintiff sue at once, or was he bound to wait
until the following day ? If the first impression is in favor of the
necessity for delay, it will, I think, disappear on investigation. It
is no doubt true in general, that a suit will not lie on the day on
which default is made in the performance of a-pecuniary obligation.
The cause of action is not complete on a promissory note until the
morning after the last day of grace; and the principle is the same
in the case of a bond. This is not because a man who is injured
eannot seek redress immediately by suit, but because non-perform-
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ance is not an injury until the time for fulfilment has expired. If
a man removes or converts the goods of another the latter may
proceed at once in trover or replevin; and so where a vendor
refuses to deliver the goods notwithstanding a tender of the price.
In like manner a man who should promise to pay a sum certain at
noon on a given day, could not complain that a writ issued the
next hour was premature. It follows that when a purchaser refuses
absolutely to accept or pay, the vendor may proceed forthwith in
debt or assumpsit. The rule that there are no parts of a day is
designed like other legal fictions for the furtherance of justice, and
does not apply, where the effect would be to frustrate or delay an
undoubted right. It is distinctly in proof that the plaintiff did not
issue the writ until the damages were liquidated by the sale of the
oil; but if it were needful this might be presumed in aid of the
remedy, and to obviate the expense and delay of another suit.
Since the above was written our attention has been called to the
case of Frost v. Knight, L. R. 7 Exch. 111. It was an action
for a breach of promise of marriage. The defendant who had
agreed to marry the plaintiff whenever his father died, declared
during the lifetime of the latter, that he was unalterably determined not to fulfil the contract, and it was held by the Excequer
Chamber (reversing the judgment of the court below), that the
plaintiff might regard the promise as broken, and sue for and recover
such damages as would have arisen from the non-fulfilment of the
agreement at the time prescribed, subject to abatement in respect
to any circumstance's that might have afforded a means of mitigating
the loss. The doctrine may therefore be regarded as established
in England, and from its intrinsic reasonableness, will, in all probability, prevail in the United States.
The rule for new trial is discharged.

Supreme Court of NTew York.
MATTER OF THE SECOND AVENUE RAILROAD COMPANY.'
An act of the legislature granting to a passenger railroad company the right to
extend its tracks over certain additional streets in the city of New York provided
I The following report, though not strictly a judicial decision, discusses some
novel and interesting points in regard to the rights of municipal corporations, thuir
control over their streets and the franchises of city passenger railways. We print
;t "-, -,cordauce with the desire of several correspondents.-ED. A. L. R.
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for compensation to the city for " the value of the rights and privileges granted."
The commissioners reported that the company should pay annually 21 per cent.
of the gross receipts for travel on the new tracks, which being calculated by the
proportion such new tracks bore in length to the whole line was fixed at P,3, of
I per cent on the whole gross receipts for travel.
The nature of property in streets, the nature and value of the franchise conferred on a passenger railroad by allowing it to lay tracks in streets, and the
principle. by which the value of such franchise may be determined, discussed.

IN the matter of the application of the Second Avenue Railroad
Company for the appointment of three commissioners to fix the
compensation to be paid to the Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of the City of New York for certain rights and privileges
granted said company by the legislature of the state of New
York. An order was made at a special term of this court, appointing Messrs. William R. Martin, Rufus '. Stivers and J.
Nelson Tappan, commissioners to appraise and determine the compensation.
The following opinion was delivered by
THE COMISSIONRS.-I. An agreement made the 15th December 1852, between the Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of
the City of New York and Denton Pearsall and eight others, gave
pernission for the construction of the road now known as the
Second Avenue Railroad. It limited the fare to five cents below
Forty-second street, and reserved power to the Common Council
to regulate the fare for the entire length of the road when it
should be completed to Harlem river. Others of the city railroads
were in like manner authorized about the same time. But it was
subsequently decided in a litigation terminated by the Court of
Appeals that the city corporation had no power to make the grants
contained in these agreements: -Davisv. .31ayor, &c.(December
1856), 14 N. Y. 506; Milhau v. Sharp (September 1863), 27 N.
Y. 611.
The Act of 1854, chap. 14, p. 323, by its third section authorized the parties or companies by whom any railroad in any of
the cities of the state had been in part constructed to complete
the same, and to that end the grants, licenses and resolutions under
which they had been in part constructed were confirmed. Under
the authority of this agreement and this act the Second Avenue
Railroad has been constructed and operated; Coleman v. Second
Avenue Railroad Company (1868), 38 N. Y. 201; and others of the
city railroads rest upon the like authority.
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I. By chapter 240 of the laws of 1872, p. 641, the Second
Nvenue Railroad Company were authorized to make certain extensions of their road which are specified in the first section of the
qct. By the third section they are required to make compensation to the Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of the City of
New York for the value of the rights and privileges granted by the
act, and to apply to the Supreme Court for the appointment of
three commissioners, who are to appraise and determine the amount
of such compensation, and whether the same should be paid annually or in a gross sum.
This is the duty imposed upon us. Since we appraise and determine that the company shall pay not a nominal, but a substantial sum as compensation, there is a propriety in stating the
grounds upon which our conclusions are reached.
The Second Avenue Railroad, before the Act of 1872, had
tracks running from the northerly end of Second avenue, at the
Harlem river, down the avenue to Twenty-third street, thence
separating, and one track running down by Second avenue, by
Forsyth and Grand streets, by the Bowery, Chatham Square, Pearl
street and Peck slip to the East river; returning by South and
Oliver streets, the Bowtry, Grand and Allen streets and the First
avenue to Twenty-third street, and by Twenty-third street to the
point of separation at the Second avenue.
The extensions given to them by the first section of the Act
of 1872 are as follows :1. An extension from Chatham street through Worth street to
Broadway, by double track.
2. An extension from Second Avenue, through Astor place, to
Broadway, by double track.
8. An extension from Second avenue, through Eighty-sixth
street, to avenue A, and thence by avenue A to the Astoria ferry,
at the fdot of Ninety-second street, by double track.
4. An extension by a single or parallel track from the Second
avenue, at Twenty-third street, through the Second avenue, Houston, Forsyth and Division streets to Chatham Square, with a side
track from the corner of Grand and Forsyth, through (rand,
Chrystie and Division streets to Chatham Square.
5. Some side and single tracks around their stables and carhouses.
IH. The various city railroads have laid their tracks upon the
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streets and avenues of the city, and by this they have gained the
following rights, privileges and advantages:1. A right of way.
2. This right of way over a street or avenue already graded.
These have been gained by the Second Avenue Road, and by
many others, without any cost or expense to the companies.
This right of way over a graded street has been supplied to the
companies by the city corporation. That corporation holds an
estate in the streets and avenues in trust for the public use. The
land in the street has been acquired by the corporation for such
use, and has been paid for; and the cost as well as the expenses
of grading and paving have been assessed upon the property in the
vicinity, or it may, in some instances, have been borne in part by
the city itself.
IV. This right of way over a graded street has value.
This is shown by the recent sale of the rights, privileges and
franchises for building a railroad in Twenty-third street, from river
to river, for $150,000. (Laws 1869, chapter 823; Laws 1872,
chapter 521.) These two miles of road were worth what it would
cost to build and equip it, and that sum beside. It was the calculation of the purchaser that the profits bf the road would pay
interest on the whole sum. It is shown also by the recent sale of
a like franchise in 125th street for $67,000. (Laws 1870, chap.
504.)
In many of the city railroads the value of the franchise at the
time the company was organized, or the sum paid for it to the
original grantees, was included in making up the amount of capital
stock and bonded debt. The cost of laying a double track on a
graded bed, and of the real estate and equipment, can be readily
compared with the official statements of the bonded debt and capital stock of each company. It will be seen that in many, if not
all of them, this franchise has been counted at a considerable sum;
that is, that the debt and capital stock largely exceed the actual
cost of the road, land and equipment, and that this excess represents the value of the property over its cost, and that is the franchise.
This will continue to be the case after adding to the cost of
laying the tracks at the outset, -the expense of the partial recon
struction which has been made necessary in many cases by the
changes of grades and the building of sewers.
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V. This fact seems to be fundamental. The railroad company
i eceive a right of way over a graded street.
If the company were obliged to purchase a right of way through
private property in this city, the cost would be so great that surfaceroads by horse-power could not be run profitably.
Outside of cities railroad companies purchase rights of way,
and own them by an estate for which they pay, and which gives
them an exclusive enjoyment. But in the city they receive it on
a street which the city corporation hold for the public use. This
public use was construed in the People v. Kerr (1863), 27 N. Y.
188, broadly enough to include one of these railroads as a public
use. though this construction has since been qualified.
The railroads in this city are to some extent and in some respects a public use. So far as they are not a public use, but take
and hold for an exclusive enjoyment, and thus become a burden on
the land, there is a ground and a principle for the payment of
compensation by them.
But they construct and operate their roads, besides this qualified
public use, also for their own gain and profit. They take possession of the street for a new use, in accordance with and serving
and enlarging the public use, and also by the just and practical
operation of the thing, being in some respects an exclusive use and
serving to enrich a corporation.
They obtain their rights and privileges over a way already
graded for them, and this right of way has value and is reckoned
as a material element in their franchise.
For what they thus receive it is just that they should make compensation.
VI. For what they give the city corporation should receive compensation.
It was held in the case of the People v. Kerr, above cited, that
the estate of the city corporation in the streets was not of a
character to be protected by the constitutional limitations upon the
right of eminent domain; that is, that the legislature might give
to a railroad company the right to construct and operate a road
upon the streets, and that the city corporation were not entitled to
compensation under the provision of the Constitution which forbids
the taking of private property for public use without just compensation.
It was also held that the interest in the use of the streets or thb
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ownership thereof was publicijuris, and fhat the power of regulating such use was vested in the legislature as the representative of
the people, and that the legislature had power to authorize one of
the city railroads to construct a track on the streets withcut the
consent of the municipal corporation. This doctrine proceeded on
the idea that the construction of a railroad in the street was an
appropriation to public use.
In the subsequent case of Craig v. Boclester City Railroad
(1868), 30 N. Y. 404, it was held that the construction of a horserailroad in East avenue, in the city of Rochester, was an appropriation of the highway for a new and distinct purpose entirely
foreign from its original object, and which entitled the owners to
compensation.
The owners in that case were the owners of land bounding on
the street, seised in fee to the centre of the street, subject to
the easement of a public highway.
Such a railroad was held to be an additional 'burden upon the
fee, on the ground that the railroad company had an exclusive
right to the use of their tracks while the cars were passing,
which precluded other vehicles, and that this was inconsistent with
the public easement. This conclusion was reached by applying the
rules established in reference to steam-railroads to horse-railroads,
without discrimination except a difference in degree of use.
Although a perusal of the dissenting opinion in that case will
leave a doubt whether such a doctrine would be applied to horserailroads in the city of New York, it may be regarded as a rule of
law that a horse-railroad in -the streets of a city is a new and to
some extent an exclusive use, a burden upon the owner of the fee,
and entitled that owner to compensation.
In the case of the streets in the city of New York, the owneri
of the lands bounding on the streets have no estate which entitlei
them to this compensation or any part of it. From them the city
aas acquired an estate in fee, in trust for the people of the state.
- that the same be appropriated and kept open as public streets
for ever."
The power of regulating the use of the streets, including railroad grants, is vested in the legislature, and the city corporation
holds its estate subject to this pbwer, and because their estate is so
subjected they are not entitled te the compensation provided for
all other owners
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The legislature, therefore, in making new grants to city railroads may. as in this case, impose as a condition that compensation
shall be made to the city corporation.
The city corporation thus has a clear and distinct legal right to
compensation for the new burden imposed on the fee and for the
exclusive use taken in the construction and operation of a horserailroad, and also, on the ground that they have, at their own
,xpense, or by a local assessment on the property bordering on the
street, graded and paved it, and thus supplied the railroad company with a graded road-bed; and that this has pecuniary value,
and is a material portion of the value of the company's franchise.
VII. This estate of the city corporation in the street in trust
for the public use, is property-valuable property. In its graded
state it has cost something, and has been paid for, not by general
taxation, but by municipal assessment. Upon this graded street
the railroad company acquire a valuable easement-a right of way
from the people through the legislature. It is not a gift of the
people, for it was not made at the expense of the people. They
charge the railroad company to make compensation to the city corporation.
VIII. By the construction and operation of city railroads, the
companies on the one hand and the city corporation and the people on the other, gain many advantages in their nature reciprocal
and compensatory.
A convenient transit through the city is gained for the people.
This is of the greatest consequence. The growth of the city in
trade, population, wealth and taxable property depends upon it.
This growth tends to bring the whole island into occupation, and
benefits not only the owner of vacant land up town, but the owner
of improved land down town, for it increases the taxable value of
land up town and diminishes the burden of taxes on the down
town owner. It brings all the land on the island under taxation
at nigh values, instead of leaving the land down town subject to
taxation at high values and that up town at low values.
Bat this convenient transit attracts population to settle along
the lines of the roads. The population becomes dense and largely
increases the through and the way travel on the railroads and
enhances their profits.
In some streets the travel, other than the cars, is impeded, and
access to the sidewalks and houses from the carriage-way is em-
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barrassed; but compensating advantages are found in the increme
of the travel and its effect on the business of the street and the
rental value of its property.
The ordinary police protection given to these companies by the
municipal government and the repairs of the injury they occasion
to the pavements are not to be considered in fixing this compensation. The rails bear some of the travel which without them would
wear the pavements, and these are matters to be compensated by
the annual taxation.
There are other causes, such as internal improvements and improvements on the city borders, which will promote the growth of
the city, and these will also increase the number of passengers on
city railroads. The opening of the channel at Hell Gate and the
bridge now being built over the East river are illustrations.
IX. The following points have been considered in their bearing
on the principle and measure of compensation:1. That the rate of fare is limited by the people at an amount
favorable to themselves. The parallel roads through the city are
not left to free competition for travel, but low rates of fare are
fixed.
Obviously a scale of fares so low that it is cheaper for a man to
ride than to walk is greatly in the interest of the people. It is one
mode of compensation by which the people derive a great benefit.
If there were reserved power to make a further reduction of fare
for the good of the people, so that this reduction and the compensation we are considering were two ways of reaching the same
result, a serious question would be presented. Between the two
the former mode of compensation might prevail. But it does not
appear that this power has not been fully exercised. There is no
reserved right further to reduce the rates of passenger fare. Taking
it, therefore, at its present scale, the railroad companies are making
money; their net profits are sufficient to pay an interest on an
amount of capital and bonded debt large enough to include something for the value of the franchise.
2. That the construction of lines of steam transit on this island
will injuriously affect the surface-roads, and those particularly on
or near the lines of steam transit.
It must be regarded as indisputable that the immediate result of
steam transit would be to fill up the island with population. A
dense population will in due proportion increase the way travel
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on the surface-roads. It would interfere with and take awa
the through travel, but the way travel, which is the profitable
part of the business, would increase with the density of the population.
Even in the case of a horse-railroad on an avenue along which
there ran, elevated or underground, a line of steam transit, that
line would draw to it so much travel that the character and business of the avenue would improve, and this would increase the way
travel.
If an elevated steam-road were to be built along the Second or
Third avenues, which are now valuable principally for buiness
purposes, the way or surface travel would in time tend towards the
wvenue which was the line of steam transit, for the reason that it,
bEtween the two, would become the main thoroughfare, and that
tha main thoroughfare would supply the best way business.
3. That the use of the same tracks by other roads decreases the
business of the first road by the competition, and diminishes its
value.
The exclusive right of one road to use its tracks is limited by
the right given to other roads to run over the same tracks or on
a parallel track in the same street on a part of the route. When
this competition is at a terminal point of a road, and the two ioads
run on parallel lines, it may seriously diminish the travel on the
first road.
Such is the case with the Second Avenue Railroad, and con.
sideration must be given to the fact. In other respects these points
have no controlling force on the question we have to decide.
X. The general franchise of a railroad company includes mor,
than they receive from the city corporation. It is the sum of thE
powers a corporation has of accomplishing its purposes and of
making money, subject to the duties imposed upon it. On general
principles of public policy a discrimination is to be made between
the aggregate value of the franchise and that portion of it for which
they should make compensation. The public convenience and advantage are a motive which the legislature in granting these fran.
chises, and the just profits of those whose energy and forethought
.stablish them, should not be interfered with.
The whole value of the franchise, as determined by calculation
of the profits of a city railroad and thence of the worth of its
capital, and by deducting therefrom the cost of its construction, lands
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and equipment, is not to be taken as the guide to the determina
tion of this compensation.
XI. Where a railroad company acquires a right of way by pur
chase they pay the market value of the land; if by lease, they pay
a rent measured by a percentage on such value.
The occupation of the streets by the city railroads is in the nature of the perpetual lease of a right of way, or for a term as
long as their charter endures, for a mixed public and private use in
common with all other public uses, and yet in some respects an exclusive use and a burden on the land.
We must appraise the value of such an occupation in determining the compensation.
It should be in the form of an annual payment in the nature of
a rent. It is in accordance with the best policy of a municipal administration to have fixed sources of annual income rather than
accessions of capital.
This annual payment, in view of the term and time of the occupation, and of the progressive growth of values, should be variable
from time to time, as is customary in long leases, and not be fixed
at the outset for all the future.
A proper measure would be a percentage on the profits of the
company, or rather, what would be practically more convenient and
equally just, on its gross receipts from travel. The annual payment
would then accord with the company's business, and would keep in
proportion to the value of the franchise and to the private gain and
profit of the company.
XII. If a general rule were now to be applied to all the railroads in the city, their statistics for many years past serve to show
what would be just between them and the city, and not burdensome to them.
[Here the commissioners set out a statement of the capital
stock and bonded debt, the receipts from passengers, and expenses
and cost of repairs for ten horse-railroads in New York city, for
the years 1869, 1870 and 1871.]
There are a few instances where compensation has been fixed
or attempted, as follows:1. The case of the Dry-dock, East Broadway and Battery Road,
where a provision was made for the payment "of five per cent. of
the net proceeds of the cars run thereon into the treasury of the
city yearly :" Laws 1866, chapter 883.
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2. The case of the Avenue C Railroad, which was required to
pay $1000 annually: 2 Laws 1868, p. 1320.
3. The case of the railroad in Twenty-third street. The purchase at $150,000 is equivalent to an annual payment of seven
per cent. thereon-810,500.
4. The case of the railroad in 125th street. The purchase at
867,000 is equivalent to an annual payment of seven per cent.
thereon-$4690.
5. The case of the Gilbert Elevated Railroad-Company (Laws
1872, chap. 885), which stipulated that the commissioners named
in the 3d section of the act might fix the compensation to the
city, but no action under this stipulation has been announced.
6. The case of the Harlem Railroad Company, whose extension
is made subject to a provision for compensation: Laws 1872, chap.
825.
From the official statistics of the several city railroads an ap
proximate estimate might be made of the value of the franchis.3
in each case on the principle stated in section 4. A calculation
of the pecuniary value of what the city gives, the right of way
over a graded street, and the surrender of the street to a burdensome and somewhat exclusive use, might not produce a result in
figures to be regarded with entire satisfaction. The proportion
this would bear to the total value of the franchise would be indeterminate.
It is obvious that, apart from such minute or exact calculations,
a just appraisement on this question must include a consideration
of all the facts and principles which have been stated, and of all
the proofs and allegations of the parties, which have been fully
and carefully laid before us, and ably and fairly presented in
argument. The range of evidence has been broad, and nothing
bearing on the general question has been excluded.
From such a consideration we have come to the determination
chat two and one-half per cent. of the gross receipts of the city
railroad companies for passenger travel would be a just and fair
annual payment to the city corporation for the rights and privileges granted to and enjoyed by them. This is the minimum rate.
If a decision as to all the railroads had been required, we can see
that our investigations might have led to a higher percentage.
XIII. Although we are not called on to decide this question as
1
iv as we have above stated it, still a survey and examination
X xxI.-30
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of the facts and principles that bear on all and each of the city
railroads, and such a conclusion as we have reached, have been
necessary in order to apply a just measure to the Second Avenue
Railroad Company.
It would be unjust to apply to them a rule that did not in principle apply equally to- the other city railroads, or a measure of
payment that did not meet the facts common to them all alike
On both sides the case has been presented to us in this aspect.
XIV. The compensation to be determined is for the value of
the new extensions of the Second Avenue Road, and not for their
main line.
There is room for difference of opinion whether these extensions
are more or less important and valuable than any other portion of
equal length of their main line. At two places down town they
lead to Broadway, the main central thoroughfare of the-city, and
up town to an important ferry. They will not be run as branches
of the main road, but cars running over the main line will diverge
down town-some of them to Astor Place, some to Worth street,
and others to the East river, and likewise diverge up town to their
two terminal points on the Harlem river.
The road has heretofore been in fact a border road, running
from the East river at Peck slip, where it passes several ferry
landings, up along the east side of the city to the Harlem river.
Alone of all city railroads it does not approach or cross Broadway. The two lines which run parallel with it on the Third and
the Fourth avenues both start from Broadway, but do not connect
down town with the ferries. These extensions down town bring
this road to Broadway, and give it a share of the travel from that
thoroughfare, though not at very valuable points.
When these extensions are operated by the company it will not
ba practicable to discriminate between the receipts from the extensions and those of the main line. A proportion must therefore be
determined between the value of the extensions and that of the
main line, a value made up from the relative cost of construction
and profits of operation.
This proportion will be most fairly arrived at by taking the
ength of the extensions and the length of the whole road, and
holding the value of the extensions to be the proportion of their
length to the total length.
This results as follows:-
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FEET.

The main line has of double track,
The main line has of single track,

.

Equal to double track,

.

.

Total length in double track,
The extensions have of double track,
The extensions have of single track,

29,934

.
.

23,740
11,870

41,804

.

8,551
.

12,403
6,201

Equal to double track,

Total length in double track,
Total length of road,

.

.

.

14,752

.

.

.

56,556

The extensions will be twenty-six per cent. in length of the
whole road.
XV. This company has had since its organization less business
and smaller profits than some of the other city roads. It has had
a long line through a sparse population, and a route not terminating at either end at any great city centre, nor touching its main
central thoroughfare, Broadway; and it has had between it and
Broadway two competing and successful roads.
This compensation is to be awarded against this road alone.
Out of all the city railroads, with the exceptions above stated,
none are subjected to this payment, nor are they liable to make
such a compensation, unless they hereafter obtain extensions of
their roads or renewals of their contracts or charters, and it should
be then imposed as a condition. The rule should be applied
against such a company with more moderation than it would be if
all were to make a similar payment.
Upon the measure of compensation of two and a half per cent.
as a just rule for all companies, the amount chargeable upon this
company for its extensions, upon the proportion of twenty-six per
cent. between them and the whole road, would be 65-100 of one
per cent. on its gross receipts from passenger travel.
But from this, for the reasons above stated, we are inclined to
make an abatement.
VI. We therefore appraise and determine that the Second
Avenue Railroad Company, in the city of New York, shall pay
annually, on the 1st day of November in each year, commencing
on the 1st day of November 1874, to the Mayor, Aldermen and

